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4ABSTRACT
This paper uses the most recent wave of Consumer Expenditure
Survey 2004-05 to examine the distribution of Out of Pocket (OOP)
healthcare payments in India. The purpose of the paper is threefold;
first, to analyse the magnitude and distribution of  OOP  spending across
states and between rural and urban settings; second, to comprehend the
impact of OOP payments on poverty and; third, to review progressivity
of OOP payments vis-à-vis levels of healthcare utilisation. Further, to
facilitate a temporal and systematic analysis the results are compared
with few other earlier studies on the subject. In conclusion, the paper
argues for policy initiatives to improve utilisation of healthcare services
and to design financing mechanisms that safeguard poor from making
unjust payments.
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51. Introduction
The issue of health financing has recently started to receive a
good deal of attention among researchers and policymakers in India
(see, among others, Rao et al 2005, Selvaraju 2003, Peters et al 2002,
Mahal et al 2001, Garg 2001, and more recently, Garg and Karan 2009).
Most of the studies on this subject note that India is one of the highly
privatised health systems in the world where household OOP direct
payments account for almost three-quarters of the total health
expenditure (see NCMH 2005; Government of India 2005; Mahal et al.
2005; also see, O’Donnell et al 2008; van Doorslaer et al 2007). These
payments - being uncertain in nature and magnitude - often intimidate
the subsistence requirements of several income-poor households and
are detrimental to social welfare. Adversities related to OOP spending
are apparent in the form of intensified poverty and ill-fare in the country.
For instance, in 1995-96 an estimated 2.2% of the Indian population
fell into poverty because of OOP spending (Peters et al 2002) and it
increased to around 3.2% in 1999-2000 (Garg and Karan 2009). What is
even more disconcerting is to note that most of the income-poor
individuals are left in discomforting situations in matters of healthcare
utilisation - particularly, inpatient care - and resort to desperate means
such as financial borrowing and (productive) asset sales to meet their
requirements (see Peters et al. 2002; Dilip and Duggal 2002). In fact, for
several individuals sheer inability to meet health expenses are proving
6inimical to all important rights to health and life. Such inherent concerns
denounce OOP payments as one of the most inefficient modes of health
system financing.
In this paper, using the most recent wave of Consumer Expenditure
Survey (2004-05), we analyse the magnitude and distribution of OOP
spending in India; across states and between rural and urban settings.
The paper, primarily, intends to provide a systematic analysis on the
issues involved by comparing the key results with findings of earlier
studies on the subject. In particular, we  develop a narrative on poverty
impact of OOP payments and facilitate a discussion on its major
components. Further, the distribution of OOP payments is examined to
obtain some evidence on disproportionate spending. Although, we
employ the methods suggested by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001) to
discern the incidence of disproportionate spending but, unlike the
authors, this study prefers to avoid their interpretation as catastrophic
expenditure because it has a much broader connotation and cannot be
plausibly captured through the available data. The paper also attempts
to draw some further conclusions on progressivity of OOP payments in
India. Progressivity in healthcare financing is noted to be a desirable
feature of the health system and entails that the share of the total financing
burden borne by the lower income groups should be lesser than their
share of society’s income (see Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2000; 2001).
The aforesaid principle helps to assess fairness in healthcare payments
and provides valuable insights towards devising any feasible
intervention. However, the paper argues that  it is pertinent to review the
underlying distribution of healthcare utilisation before endorsing the
simple inference on progressivity. Clearly, progressivity as a concept
can be a virtue if it is accompanied by a greater and more equitable
utilisation of healthcare. But in India - and even across several developing
countries – progressivity in healthcare payments can be largely
attributed to high cost of healthcare which deters effective utilisation
and produces differentials across income groups (see O’Donnell et al
72008). In concluding, the paper reiterates the need for policy initiatives
to improve utilisation of healthcare services and argues for development
of health interventions that safeguard poor from making unjust
payments.
2. Data and Methods
The study uses the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) 2004-05
data of India, collected by the National Sample Survey Organisation
(NSSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation,
Government of India. The CES 2004-05 covers a sample of 124644
households (around 79298 rural and 45346 urban) and provides
information on household health expenditure and total household
consumption expenditure. Similar information is also collected in NSSO
Morbidity and Healthcare Survey (MHS) 2004. However, we have
preferred CES for the analysis because in MHS abridged version of
consumption expenditure schedule is canvassed which usually
underestimates total household consumption expenditure as compared
with that found in the quinquennial CES rounds1 (NSSO 2006a; 2006b
and, for a helpful discussion, see Garg and Karan 2009). In particular,
the CES information on institutional (inpatient care) and non-
institutional (all expenditures on health care other than inpatient care)
health expenditures provided in the dataset are clubbed together to
obtain total OOP health expenditure. These health expenditures are
categorised and recorded under (a) medicine; (b) X-ray, ECG, pathological
test, etc.; (c) doctor’s/surgeon’s fee; (d) hospital & nursing home charges;
(e) family planning; and (f) other medical expenses (not recorded above).
The recall period for institutional health expenditure is ‘last one year’
1 The CES administers a detailed interview schedule for collecting information
on household consumption expenditure whereas MHS collects the same
information through short set of five questions. Moreover, the recall period
for non-institutional expenditure (outpatient care) is different in CES (last
30 days) and MHS (last 15 days). See for details, NSSO (2006a; 2006b) and
for a helpful discussion see Garg and Karan (2009).
8and for non-institutional health expenditure is ‘last 30 days’ therefore the
institutional health expenditure is divided by 12 and is assumed as the
institutional expenditure for one month. Using the household level
information (and the specified sample weights), individual-level estimates
are obtained by dividing the aggregate expenditure with total number of
household members.  Expenditure on medicines recorded separately under
institutional and non-institutional expenditure is added to compute  its
share in total health expenditure across different states.
A reasonable outline of the problem is presented by adopting the
approach of Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003; 2001) and (Garg and
Karan 2009). A simple measure of poverty headcount ratio (H) is used to
comprehend the poverty impact of healthcare payments in 2004-05.
Poverty status of individuals is adjudged by comparing individual
incomes with official poverty lines (Planning Commission of India for
2004-05) provided differently for states and sectors (rural-urban). In the
pre-payment situation, all the individuals whose consumption
expenditure (Y) fall short of the stipulated poverty lines (z) are designated
as poor; and the poverty headcount ratio is denoted as
Hpre (Hpre =Σ ni /N; ni = 1 if Yi < z , otherwise ni = 0). In the post-payment
situation, all the individuals whose consumption expenditure (Y) net of
healthcare payments (M) fall short of the stipulated poverty lines (z) are
designated as poor; and the poverty headcount ratio is denoted as Hpost
(Hpost = Σni /N; ni = 1 if (Yi – Mi) < z , otherwise ni = 0). The poverty
impact (Hpi) of healthcare payments is then computed as the simple
difference between Hpost and Hpre (Hpi = Hpost - Hpre). Similar method is
used to estimate the poverty impact of non-institutional healthcare
expenditure. Although, data inadequacies restrain a clear empirical
characterisation of catastrophic expenditure in India, nonetheless, the
paper attempts to present some insights on disproportionate health
expenditures across major Indian states and examine its incidence. These
proportions are based on the consideration that a significant number of
Indian households survive in the neighbourhood of the poverty line
9and, therefore, the obtained estimates can be effective in exposing the
incidence of the problem. Here, disproportionate expenditure refers to
OOP payments that exceed certain pre-determined thresholds (here set
at 5 percent and 10 percent) of total consumption expenditure across
the rural-urban setting in different Indian States2. For this purpose, first
the share of total healthcare payments (M) to total consumption
expenditure (Y) is computed to examine the number of households whose
medical expenditure is greater than 5% and 10% of their total
consumption expenditure. Formally, let Tp be the headcount ratio of
households incurring payments in excess of a given threshold cut-off
point p (p set at 5% and 10%), and could be written as Tp = Σni /N, where
i=(1, 2, …, N) and N is the total number of  individuals in the society. For
ith individual, ni can assume only two values (0 or 1); i.e., ni = 1, if
Mi/Yi  ≥  p and ni = 0, if Mi/Yi < p. It implies that, ni assumes a value of
one only if the share of total healthcare payments to total consumption
expenditure is greater than or equal to the specified threshold point (p);
otherwise ni takes a value of zero.
Lorenz curve, concentration curve and concentration index are
used to examine the linkage between OOP payments and total
household consumption expenditure. The Lorenz curve plots the
percentage of the population arranged from the poorest to the richest
are represented on the horizontal axis (x-axis) and the percentage of
consumption expenditure enjoyed by the bottom x% of the population
is shown on the vertical axis (y-axis) (see Sen 1973). Concentration
curve (CC) is a generalisation of the Lorenz curve whereby specific
2 The impact of healthcare payments in India could be analysed in several
ways. For instance, Gumber (2002) comprehends it in terms of share of
health expenditure in annual income while Dilip and Duggal (2002) broaden
the concept of income by including aspects such as sale of household assets
and borrowings to analyse the burden of healthcare expenditure. Some of
the recent studies on India (Garg and Karan, 2004) use the methods discussed
in Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003) and have tried to comprehend financial
distress in terms of catastrophic payments on healthcare with varying but
arbitrarily defined thresholds.
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CC plots the percentage of the population arranged from the poorest
to the richest are represented on the horizontal axis and the percentage
of aggregate OOP healthcare payment incurred by the bottom x% of
the population is shown on the vertical axis (see Kakwani 1980). The
concentration index (CI) is defined as twice the area between the
concentration curve and the line of equality (45 degree line). It ranges
between +1 and -1 and takes positive (negative) values when there is
a disproportionate concentration of OOP payments among the rich
(poor)3. Progressivity of health care payments on pre-payment income
is measured by using Kakwani’s (1977) index, KM. It is defined as
twice the area between the Lorenz curve for pre-payment income and
the concentration curve for health care payments and is formed by
plotting the cumulative share of OOP payments on the vertical axis
against the cumulative proportion of individuals ranked by pre-
payment consumption expenditure on the horizontal axis. If KM is
positive the OOP payments are progressive and if it is negative then
they are regressive in nature. The redistributive effect is measured by
using the Reynolds-Smolensky index, RSM and is described as the
increase or reduction in income inequality resulting due to difference
in pre-payment to post-payment income distributions (Reynolds and
Smolensky, 1977). This index can be defined as twice the area between
the Lorenz curve for prepayment income and the concentration curve
for post-payment income. If the computed RSM is positive then the
redistribution through payments generates a pro-poor income
distribution and if negative then it produces a pro-rich distribution.
All the figures presented here are based on the weighted sample, as
suggested by NSSO (2006b). The discussion of the results is also
3 The CI can be computed by using convenient covariance result (Kakwani,
1980; Jenkins, 1988; Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1989) as follows
CI = 2 cov(yi, Ri) /μ,
Where y is the OOP payment whose inequality is being measured, μ is its
mean, Ri is the ith individual’s fractional rank in the income distribution and
cov(yi, Ri,.) is the covariance. We follow Kakwani et al (1997) for
computation of CI based on grouped data.
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corroborated with some findings on healthcare utilisation from
Morbidity and Healthcare Survey 2004.
3. Distribution of OOP payments and Poverty Impact
The CES 2004-05 records the average monthly per capita OOP
payment for rural India at Rs. 36.3 ($0.8) and Rs. 57.4 ($1.3) for urban
India (see Tables 1 & 2). With the exception of Uttar Pradesh, the
observed pattern of OOP spending is in conformity with the
developmental status of the states implying that richer states have a
higher average per capita OOP spending on healthcare. The state of
Kerala continues to possess the highest average monthly per capita
OOP payments of Rs. 101.8 and Rs. 122.2 in rural and urban areas,
respectively. The lowest expenditure for rural areas is observed in the
state of Assam whereas the lowest in urban areas is in Bihar. Although,
a gradual increase in health spending across rural and urban areas is
discernible through the tables, but, the pattern of OOP spending across
states and regions is somewhat similar to what was noticed during the
1990s. In fact, the changes are visible only in terms of relative distances
in the magnitude of such payments. For instance, NSSO (2006b) reports
that the per capita OOP spending in rural Kerala is almost eight times
that of rural Bihar and two times that of rural Haryana. Similarly, the
average per capita spending in urban Kerala is around five times that
of urban Bihar and twice that of urban Gujarat and urban Punjab.
However, a significant change could be noticed in  per capita private
spending in Kerala which during the 1990s  was comparable with
those of Punjab and Haryana and was around four times higher than
that in Rajasthan and three times that in Bihar (Peters et al 2002). The
most recent estimates suggest a considerable increase in health
spending in Kerala which could be attributed not only to greater
healthcare utilisation but also to increasing prevalence of chronic
ailments and population ageing in the state. The differentials in state-
wise average health spending can also be due to differences in the
12
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level of health transition across the states (Garg and Karan 2009).
Peters et al (2003) note that Kerala is in the late transition stage which
is marked my greater burden of lifestyle diseases and other chronic
ailments. A few backward states such as Bihar, Assam, Rajasthan and
West Bengal are in an early to mid transition stage where low incomes
of households along with limited knowledge and awareness result in
low private spending. The problem accentuates when low private
incomes are coupled with low public spending on health and further
restrain utilisation due to poor infrastructure and accessibility. However,
Uttar Pradesh - a state in early transition -continues with a higher per
capita OOP spending and perhaps requires further probing.
Comparison with previous CES (1999-2000) reveals that at the
all-India level the share of OOP payments in total consumption
expenditure has increased from 4.8% in 1999-2000 to 6.1% in 2004-
05. For 2004-05, OOP payments accounts for 6.5% of total
consumption expenditure and 14.5% of total non-food expenditure in
rural areas whereas in urban areas it forms 5.5% and 9.5%, respectively.
Higher shares in rural areas are partly due to the fact that most of the
rural population have low incomes and most of their expenses are on
food expenditure. Across the major states, OOP payments constitute
the maximum share of 10% of total consumption expenditure in rural
Kerala and 9.5% in urban Kerala. Among other states, in rural areas the
share of OOP payments is higher in Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab,
Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal; and in urban areas the share of
OOP payments is greater in Maharashtra, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh
and Uttar Pradesh (see Table 1). Further, the distribution of OOP
payments is analysed according to household consumption quintiles
to interpret the differential scale of such payments between the poor
and the rich. From Table 2 it could be inferred that the average per
capita OOP spending rises moderately with consumption quintiles
and becomes distinctively higher for the richest quintile. A clear rural-
urban divide is evident in terms of per capita OOP spending and its
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systematic difference across all quintiles. In rural areas, richest
population quintile (avg. OOP payment of Rs. 9.3) spent ten times
more than the poorest quintile (avg. OOP payment of Rs. 93.1) and in
urban areas the expenditure by richest quintile is eight times that of
the poorest quintile. When these ratios are compared with 1999-2000
figures we notice that the ratio for rural areas has remained constant
whereas the ratio for urban areas has declined from ten to eight thus
indicating some moderation in differentials.  The overall share of OOP
in total consumption expenditure from the poorest to the richest
quintiles is also noted to be progressive in nature.
In a recently published study Garg and Karan (2009), using CES
1999-2000, examine the composition of the OOP expenditure to derive
some clues regarding the components that trigger health care servicing
costs. Such components involve drugs, diagnostics, service charges etc.
On examining these components, it is found that in rural areas a major
share of expenditure is on drugs, both institutional and non-institutional.
Revisiting their concern, we notice that that the situation hasn’t change
much between the two CES surveys and drug related expenditure
continue to be the single largest component accounting for around
three-fourths of total OOP payments in India. In 2004-05, expenditure
on drugs for rural and urban India is reported to be 76% and 70% of total
OOP spending, respectively. In a few states (Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand,
Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh) it exceeds 80% of the total OOP
spending. The proportions of OOP payments on drugs are relatively
lower (but above 50%) in urban areas and some other developed states
because of involvement of other components services i.e., diagnostics,
institutional and non-institutional care. Evidently, expenditure on drugs
continues to be the single largest component of total OOP expenditure
across consumption quintiles as well. However, both in rural and urban
areas, the richer quintiles spend relatively lower proportion of their
OOP on drugs and medicine compared to the poorer quintiles (see Table
2). Across the different states, the proportion of OOP spending on drugs
15
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is well above 80% in poorer states such as Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar,
Jharkhand, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh (see Table 1). For south-India
(Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu) the drugs share in
OOP is noted to be around 60-70 percent. These findings do directly
feed into concerns regarding drugs policy across the states and perhaps
calls for improvements in drug pricing and provisioning to benefit the
poor. However, following Garg and Karan (2009), it is advisable to
consider the figures with some caution because of difficulties involved
in discerning accurately the different components of healthcare such as
drugs, diagnostics, doctor’s service charges etc. Perhaps, the
contamination could be even greater in cases (mostly in rural areas)
where doctors collect a consolidated amount which would include drug
cost as well as service charges. These intricacies invariably call for further
refinements and improvements in the designing and canvassing of health
expenditure surveys.
As mentioned earlier, Peters et al (2002) note that in 1995-96
around 2.2% of the Indian population fell into poverty because of OOP
spending and it increased to around 3.2% in 1999-2000 (Garg and Karan
2009). We also undertake a similar analysis to update and enhance the
informational base and to sensitise policymaking to safeguard low
income households from risk of poverty. For analytical purposes, the
post-payment consumption expenditure is compared against the official
poverty line to compute the poverty headcount ratios for India and its
different states (see Table 3 and Figure 1). Results indicate that, after
deduction of total OOP expenditure from the total consumption
expenditure, poverty in 2004-05 increases by 4.4% (4.6% in rural and
3.7% in urban areas). It implies that if we adjust the pre-payment poverty
headcount statistic of 27.6% for OOP payments, then revised incidence
of poverty in India would be 32%. For rural and urban India the revised
poverty headcount ratio will be, respectively, 32.9% and 29.3%. On
converting these ratios to aggregate headcount, it could be discerned
that around 48 million (36 million in rural and 12 million in urban
17
areas) persons would get added to an already existing number of 302
million poor in the country. What is even more disconcerting is to note
that around 25% of these 48 million individuals belong only to a single
state, Uttar Pradesh.
A disaggregated analysis reveals that the rural areas of Uttar
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala and Gujarat have the highest proportion
(above 6%) of population moving below the poverty line. Rural
Chhattisgarh and West Bengal also bear a poverty impact of almost 6%.
Across urban parts the highest poverty impact is in Kerala (6.7%),
followed by Rajasthan (5.8%) and Uttar Pradesh (5.1%). A comparison
with Garg and Karan (2009), informs of considerable intensification of
poverty impact across the states. In 1999-2000 only Uttar Pradesh had
an impact of over 5% but in 2002-05 the number of such states has
increased to seven and includes Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra and West Bengal (see Table 3). It is rather intriguing
to witness that richer states like Kerala and Gujarat which had an impact
of over 2% in 1999-2000 are encountering larger impact in 2004-05.
Perhaps, the reason lies in the nature of ailments prevailing in the regions
(attributable to health transition levels) or even could be due to a more
general expansion of health services which have encouraged poor
households to spend on minimal healthcare. In the post-payment situation,
Figure 1.  Poverty Headcount Ratios after accounting for OOP payments, India
2004-05
Po
ve
rt
y 
(in
 %
)
18
the aggregate incidence of poverty in rural parts is the highest in Orissa
(52%) followed by Jharkhand (50%) and Chhattisgarh (47%). For urban
parts the highest incidence of post-payment poverty is observed in Orissa
(47%), Madhya Pradesh (46%) and Chhattisgarh (45%).
In Table 3 we also present the poverty impact of non-institutional
OOP expenditure. The figures elicit that in most of the states non-
institutional spending has a major role in aggravating poverty. At the
all-India level non-institutional expenditure alone contributes to over
70% of the total poverty impact. The share of non-institutional
expenditure in total poverty impact is notably higher (around 80%) in
poorer states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Uttar
Pradesh and Uttaranchal. This exercise lay bares a rather dismal picture
of welfare across these states which invariably mean that mere outpatient
care visit is enough to push households below their basic subsistence
requirements. After viewing such appalling consequences of non-
institutional care one could only expect the individuals in these states
to be imperceptive and obtuse towards institutional care as they do not
have other choices then to forego treatment. Nonetheless, in richer states
like Gujarat, Kerala and Haryana the situation is different and non-
institutional spending causes 50% of the total poverty impact. These
figures suggest that institutional spending has a significant impact in
terms of welfare outcomes in richer states and perhaps is indicative of
lower utilisation of inpatient care in poorer states. Both the situations
definitely have very different policy connotations and require not only
financial risk pooling but also broad based targeting measures.
Nonetheless, the limitations of this type of analysis are obvious (see
Peters et al 2002). For instance, it cannot discern consumption
expenditure of individuals if they were not required to pay for healthcare.
Also, these estimates at best represent a snapshot and cannot capture the
dynamics of poverty in terms of loss of future earnings due to health
shocks.
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4. Disproportionate Healthcare Payments
This subsection studies disproportionate healthcare payments
in terms of incidence of OOP spending by individuals that exceeds
5% and 10% of their total consumption expenditure. Although
arbitrarily fixed, we believe that these proportions can be effective in
exposing the risk of poverty given the fact that a significant number of
Indian households survive in the vicinity of the poverty line. Coming
to the results, as reported in Table 4, around 32% and 16% of the rural
population, respectively, spend more than 5% and 10% of their
consumption expenditure as OOP payments. Its distribution across
rural parts of different states presents certain mixed  patterns. For
instance, higher incidence of disproportionateness is noted in high-
income states of Kerala and Punjab which also have a higher per capita
public spending. Perhaps, this could be due to reasons like more
utilisation of private facilities and to some extent these expenditures
may be complementing and facilitating the utilisation of public
services, particularly for inpatient care. The incidence of
disproportionate expenditures is also noted to be higher in low-income
states like Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh which  have very low
levels of per capita public health spending. Apart from computational
reasons like a relatively low cost of treatment can represent a greater
proportion of incomes across these states; a part of the explanation
also lies in the unavailability of general public services which can
direct households to seek treatment from private facilities at a higher
cost. Certain other low-income states like Bihar and Orissa have much
lower incidence of expenditures exceeding the specified thresholds.
In these cases of low household spending coupled with lower public
spending on public health plausibly hints at the agonies of the
population, a fact apparent through the burden of  health deprivation
observed  in these states.
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To understand whether the incidence of such expenditure is
concentrated among the richest or the poorest sections of the population
we have computed the concentration index (CI) of the incidence for the
two thresholds and are reported in Table 4. Most of CI values are positive
indicating that, both in rural and urban areas, higher healthcare
expenditures are incurred by individuals belonging to better off sections
of the society. For rural areas these CI values further intensifies for health-
poor states like Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. Alternatively, these
findings could be interpreted as income-related inequalities in health
spending which is highest in Assam and Orissa and the least in Kerala and
Haryana.  In rural Kerala, a low CI value indicate that the disproportionate
payments are well spread across the households irrespective of their income
levels and that the income-healthcare gradient is conceivably mediated
by factor(s) such as nature of ailment and perceptions regarding its severity.
In rural areas of Gujarat, Haryana and Punjab the incidence of
disproportionate expenditure is weakly concentrated among the richer
sections.  On the contrary, in rural parts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa,
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu it reflects strong concentration in favour
of the rich and serves as a hint towards income related inequities in health
spending in these states.  While this concentration increases uniformly
with the shift of threshold percentage from 5 to 10 percent,  such increase
is more revealing in case of Punjab and Madhya Pradesh further endorsing
the fact that higher health spending rests primarily with the rich. The
observed magnitude of disproportionateness at urban all-India level is
almost similar to that of rural India. In terms of inter-state variations, the
urban parts of Kerala, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and West
Bengal show higher incidence of disproportionate expenditure as against
other major states of the Indian union. However, unlike rural India there
are subtle differences in its concentration across income groups. For
instance, it could be inferred from the CI values that the concentration of
incidence in urban areas is less unequal compared to rural areas. In urban
areas of Gujarat, Rajasthan, Karnataka and Kerala the concentration of
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such disproportionate expenditure is found to be higher among the poorer
sections.
Further enquiries are required to discern the disproportionate levels
of health care expenditure that can be claimed as catastrophic
expenditures and perhaps survey designs and information content can
be improvised to facilitate authentic policy interventions.  Nevertheless,
a preliminary analysis is attempted here to comprehend the relation
between number of vulnerable members in the household and incidence
of disproportionate OOP expenditure as 10% share of total consumption
expenditure. For all India it is observed that on an average around 4.2%
household exceeds the 10% threshold and the incidence level is
associated with the number of elderly members (individuals aged 60
plus) in the household. As shown in Figure 2, if households have 5 or
more elderly then the incidence of such spending is around 15.8%. The
incidence declines to 11% in household with 3-4 elderly and is noted to
be 6.1% in households with 1-2 elderly. Similarly in households with
five or more children (aged less than 5 years) the incidence is noted to
Note: In Kerala, there was no (sample) household with 5 or more elderly
persons.
Figure 2. Percentage of households exceeding 10%threshold level by number of
children and elderly
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be around 12.6%, which declines to 6% and 5.2% for households with
3-4 and 1-2 children respectively. These results suggest that households
with more numbers of elderly and children are vulnerable to
disproportionate expenditures. Such an association is stronger for the
poorer states of India. For instance, in Uttar Pradesh around 72% of all
the households with five and more elderly persons incur expenses
exceeding 10% of their total consumption expenditure. This proportion
declines to 13% of households with 3-4 elderly and is around 5.2% for
households with 1-2 elderly. Similarly, in around 19.1% of the
households with five and more children incur expenses that exceed the
specified thresholds whereas it is noted to be around 5% for households
with less than four children. But across richer states the incidence of
disproportionateness is not strongly related with the total number of
elderly or children in the households. For instance, in Kerala the
incidence is noted to be 33.8% in households with 3-4 elderly which
declines to 23.6% in households with 1-2 elderly. Similarly in
households with 5 and above children the incidence is 34.7%, in
households with 3-4 children the incidence is 35.9% and households
with 1-2 children the incidence is 24.1%. This could be an aberration in
case of Kerala given that the sample may not be well represented with
households having five or more children. Nonetheless, this exercise
brings to the fore an added dimension that the composition of the
household is associated with vulnerability to health spending. Of course,
further enquiries along this direction are required to ascertain this
elementary association.
5. Progressivity of Healthcare Payment in India
We use the Lorenz curve and concentration curve (CC) to present
a simple sketch of progressivity of OOP payments in rural and urban all-
India. In Figure 3, the diagonal represents the line of equality and the
curves with markers are the Lorenz curves (black coloured Lorenz curve
for rural and grey coloured Lorenz curve for urban areas). Same coloured
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curves (black for rural and grey for urban), but without markers, show
the CCs for the respective areas. A comparison of these curves reveals
that the CCs lay outside the respective Lorenz curve thus indicating
progressivity of OOP payments both in rural and in urban areas. However,
based on the observed gap between the CC and Lorenz curve it can be
inferred that the magnitude of progressivity differs between urban and
rural areas. In urban areas the CC and Lorenz are much closer than rural
areas implying that in urban areas the OOP payments are distributed in
conformity with the consumption expenditure of the population whereas
in rural areas the concentration of OOP payments is much higher among
the richer sections of the population.
Table 5 reports the values of concentration index for out-of-pocket
payments, Coop, Kakwani index of progressivity of out-of-pocket
payments on prepayment income, K and the Reynolds-Smolensky index
of redistributive effect for out-of-pocket payments vis-à-vis pre-payment
income, RS. The positive and larger Coop figures of 0.45 confirm the
graphical inference that the concentration of healthcare payments among
the richer sections is higher in rural areas. In rural parts concentration of
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OOP spending is more among richer sections and is particularly higher
in Tamil Nadu and Chhattisgarh where the CI values are in excess of 0.5.
In urban parts such concentration is highest in West Bengal, Madhya
Pradesh, Haryana, Bihar and Maharashtra as discerned by the CI values
exceeding 0.4. The positive values for Kakwani’s index (K) revalidates
that, both in rural and urban India, health care payments are progressive
although the degree of progressivity is lower for urban India. For rural
India the index value is noted to be 0.15 whereas for urban India it is
computed to be 0.03. However, several interesting conclusions emerge
once we visit the state specific performance. For instance, it could be
noticed that the magnitude of Kakwani’s index varies considerably across
the states. As indicated by the negative values of K, health care payments
are regressive in rural areas of Haryana and Kerala and in urban areas of
Punjab, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka and Kerala. The
redistributive effect of OOP payments is studied with the help of Reynolds-
Smolensky index. The positive RS values indicate that as a consequence
of medical care payments income inequality declines marginally for all-
India as well as for most of the states, excepting Haryana and Kerala.
Nonetheless, negative RS values for urban parts of Punjab, Rajasthan,
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka and Kerala hints at smaller
intensifications in post-payment income inequalities.
But what does progressivity in OOP payments imply in the Indian
context? It must be noted that progressivity of a health system could be
treated as a virtue under conditions where everyone has equal access to
healthcare. However, it is widely observed that healthcare utilisation in
developing countries such as India is often distorted because of
differences in ability to pay, perceptions regarding morbidity and non-
availability of services in certain regions (Peters et al 2002). Under such
circumstances, it is plausible to come across situations where the states
demonstrate a tendency to be progressive in healthcare financing but
altogether are marked with skewed healthcare utilisation. As noted by
Peters et al (2002) such differences in OOP spending across income
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groups when combined with low use of public facilities by vulnerable
groups further triggers problems related with accessibility. NSSO
Morbidity and Healthcare Survey (2004) reports of such stark variations
in utilization rates and the number of treated spells of ailment across
different income and spatial categories. While among the poorer sections
of the population the utilization rates is around 750 persons per thousand
ailments, it peaks to around 900 persons per thousand among the richer
individuals. What is even more important is to note that around 28 percent
of the rural individuals have cited financial problems another 12 percent
have reported absence of medical facility in vicinity as a major reason not
availing treatment. The problem of financial constraints is perhaps
omnipresent and even prevents around 20 percent of the urban individuals
from seeking healthcare. These findings suggests that in India progressivity
in OOP payment is  a result of systematic bias in inclusion of the various
sections of the population that is largely determined by aspects such as
geographical location and socioeconomic status (O’Donnell et al 2007).
Also, we have overlooked the issue of borrowings and indebtedness among
high income households which superficially contributes to a progressive
structure of financing but undeniably has wider repercussions. Because
of such apprehensions, it becomes all the more important to assess
progressivity in a much broader framework.
An argument which can probably restore the importance of
progressivity in direct payments emanates from the hypothesis that most
of the poor in India perhaps benefit from its large public health system
and thus will not be required to incur huge OOP expenses. But even this
hypothesis could be somewhat weakened by the fact that, irrespective
of income categories and sector of origin, healthcare utilisation (both
for institutional and non-institutional care) is heavily biased in favour
of private sector. Such apprehension is validated by the Morbidity and
Healthcare 2004 survey which finds that around 80% of total ailments
are treated from the private sources. While for rural areas it varied from
70% for the poorest to 82% for richest sections; in urban areas it varied
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from 74% to 89% (see, NSSO 2006a). These figures are symptomatic of
unsatisfactory reach and performance of the public health system in
many of the Indian states. Therefore, if we encounter regressivity in
healthcare payments then perhaps it might qualify as an indicator of
improved utilisation levels although it may be accompanied by obvious
impoverishing effect - as observed in Kerala4. It must be noted that this
paper views both the aspects – utilisation and impoverishing effect – as
two prominent policy concerns deserving equal attention but nevertheless
are worth highlighting because they require different policy approach
across different socioeconomic categories. In fact, insurance against
impoverishment and improvements in utilisation are possible only if
health systems of these regions are working in a more equitable fashion.
6. Conclusion
This study revisits the distribution of healthcare payments in India
and analyses - the incidence of disproportionateness in OOP spending;
progressivity of such payments and; its poverty impact. The results
presented here revalidate that richer section of the population are
spending more on healthcare as compared with the poor. In a relative
sense, poorer sections continue to spend a major share of the OOP
expenditure on purchase of drugs and medicine and only a smaller share
is allocated on components such as diagnostics, service charges and
other institutional or non-institutional expenses. Our finding
substantiates the concerns raised by Garg & Karan (2009) and reaffirms
the need for policy attention on drugs expenditure to curb the expanding
component of OOP spending. Furthermore, the study notes that OOP
spending acts stern on the poverty status of the household and pushes
4 Partly, the regressive patterns in Kerala are observed due to higher prevalence
of short duration acute ailments, a definitive age pattern in prevalence of
chronic illness involving longer duration of treatment and greater utilisation
of private sector for in-patient care (Dilip 2002, 2007; Navaneetham and
Kabir, 2006). Healthcare spending by lower income groups is also facilitated
by Self Help Groups activities whereby around 20% of the borrowing is
spend on healthcare (Narayana 2008b).
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several of them below the poverty line, particularly in the rural areas of
backward states. Larger contributions of non-institutional spending in
poverty impact are worth revealing because it is correlated with issues
like limited availability of public health services, low utilisation levels
and poor ability to pay. A general analysis of OOP expenditure related
catastrophe is not attempted here because it can only be facilitated
through indicators such as loss of productive assets and indebtedness of
the household along with issues of pure health loss (including loss of
life) and its direct/indirect impact on the household. Nonetheless, the
exercise of describing incidence and concentration of disproportionate
OOP payment has reinforced the elementary notion that healthcare
utilisation is in general concentrated among richer individuals. It is also
discernible that higher incidences of disproportionateness are often
coupled with lower concentration and lower incidence with higher
concentration. Therefore, while comparing incidence of
disproportionateness for its implied adversity, it is relevant to discuss
concentration adjusted incidence levels to moderate the differential
incidence across states. We find that disproportionate expenditures
among states in early stages of health transition (Uttar Pradesh) are
associated with composition of the households. For example the
incidence of such expenditure is more among households with large
number of dependents (elderly 60+ years and children below 5 years).
For states in later stages of health transition (Kerala) the association is
diluted and might be due to differences in nature of ailments and issues
like quality of care. The OOP spending profile of Kerala suggests that
because of epidemiological transition and the growing burden of lifestyle
diseases the demand for curative care, which is often resource-intensive,
is also increasing. With increasing privatisation of diagnostics and drug
supplies several low-income households find it difficult to avail
treatment. The government of India although has attracted some interest
of the private sector to setup health care facilities in high priority areas
but so far the performance of such collaborations has been quite ordinary
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and somewhat extemporized as there are procedural ambiguities in the
financial, legal and institutional set up of partnerships (Baru and Nundy,
2008). In this context, it becomes important that collaborations are
successfully expanded to tackle the mounting burden of lifestyle diseases
and other chronic conditions in several Indian states5. Moreover, new
methods to advance the partnership in the delivery of outpatient care
services should be designed. One of the essential features of such
partnerships should be drafting of treatment plans for patients by giving
due importance to the issue of equity in access and utilisation of healthcare
based upon important socioeconomic or geographical conditions. Perhaps,
the government may also be required to address the grievances of the
states with poor infrastructure to encourage such partnerships.
For most of the Indian states, OOP payment is progressive in nature
and indicates of a compression in inequality levels in the post-payment
situation. But progressivity in Indian context reflects a different problem
altogether wherein the rural poor are constrained because of reasons
such as low incomes, limited access to healthcare, lack of awareness and
poor infrastructure. In view of such facts, direct healthcare payments
should be viewed as regressive instrument (Whitehead et al 2001) and
as a proxy for inequality in appropriation of health benefits whereby the
richer sections gain invariably from a direct spending on health services
while the poorest endure further deteriorations in health. For
policymakers it represents dual concerns of; a) improving access and
utilisation through expansion of public facilities and b) development
of innovative financing mechanisms to achieve desirable distribution
of healthcare expenditures. The need for much wider health policy
coverage in rural areas is essential to improve utilisation of health
5 According to National Health Accounts of India (2001-02) 87.7 per cent of
the total private health spending has been utilised for curative care services.
The brunt of escalating costs of curative care is largely borne by the poorer
sections of the society and more so because the government has been
largely absent in its provisioning.
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services and at the same time to safeguard poor from making unjust
payments. A progressive health system with universal access and
utilisation can perhaps render redistributive effect that would be much
more favourable to the society. The preliminary remarks presented here
nonetheless require greater analytical attention to identify the multiple
constraints for accessing medical care across regions. Limited resources
and other fiscal caps, certainly restrains public health systems to invest
appropriately in expansion of services, quality improvement, expensive
medical treatment and medical research (see Narayana 2008b).
Nonetheless, there are lessons to be learned which are beyond such
constraints. For instance, why Kerala allocates a considerable proportion
of its public expenditure towards social sectors and why other backward
states fail to arrive at consensus on higher social expenditure.
In recent times, compulsory insurance schemes have emerged as
an interesting approach to combat difficulties in healthcare seeking. At
present, India has a few health insurance schemes largely classified as
mandatory health insurance schemes, voluntary health insurance
schemes, employer-based health insurance and community-based health
insurance schemes. However, a large proportion of the population
remains outside the net of such schemes and therefore inclusion of the
population in health welfare schemes certainly requires special
provisions for vulnerable sections of the population. This is because
equity in access to health can be achieved mainly through compulsory
insurance, which especially for poorer countries would invariably mean
that insurance premiums are to be independent of health status. Perhaps,
micro-insurance is also emerging as an interesting option towards this
end where the nodal agencies have a vital role to play (Ranson 2002;
Ahuja, 2005). However, to further this intent, as well as to comprehend
other complex issues, it is important that we develop a rather specific and
comprehensive data collection and analytical approach to engage with
substantive issues pertaining to health financing including study on
insurance potential, catastrophic, and impoverishing effects of healthcare
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payments. Use of appropriate reference period (accounting for recall bias)
for data collection, an elaborate expenditure account by nature of service
and providers can provide some further insights for health policies.
In summary, this analysis is indicative of the persisting miseries
of Indian population who are required to trade-off their basic
consumption expenses because of uncertain episodes of medical illness.
These expenditures are often unavoidable and seldom leave one with a
twosome choice, i.e., whether to seek treatment or not to do so? Given
these findings, it is important to discontinue its treatment as everyday
trivia and revive analytical and political efforts for developing right set
of institutions to minimise toll on social welfare. Initiatives like National
Rural Health Mission of India that intends to improve utilisation of
health services in rural areas are definitely efforts in the right direction
but much remains to be done.
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